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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

For Week Ending
2 June 1948


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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

For Week Ending
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Palestine cease-fire beset with difficulties: Although Jews and Arabs have accepted a cease-fire in principle, early agreement on the conditions for a cessation of hostilities is improbable. There is considerable disparity between the belligerents on the questions of the admission of immigrants of military age to Palestine during the period of the truce and on the re-opening of a Jewish supply line to Jerusalem. Moreover, much acrimonious debate may be anticipated in the Security Council before these and other problems can be solved to the satisfaction of both parties. Even if agreement is finally reached, the truce will be an uneasy one punctuated by accusations of violation by each side and by desultory fighting.

The chance is remote that during the four-week period of the truce a basis for a permanent settlement of the Palestine problem can be established. Both sides are as uncompromising as ever on fundamental issues. The Arabs refuse to concede the possibility of a sovereign and independent Jewish state with freedom of immigration, which is the foundation of Jewish demands. The one hope of a solution appears to lie in the coordination of US and UK policy to put pressure on Jews and Arabs to accept a nominally federal state in which the Jewish areas would be autonomous and to which the Arabs would permit a substantial degree of immigration. Failing such a solution, an indefinite continuation of strife in Palestine and unrest throughout the Middle East appear to be inevitable.

The military picture in Palestine: Military operations in Palestine have become concentrated in three areas: (1) Jerusalem and its vital supply road from Tel Aviv; (2) the environs of Tel Aviv; and (3) the Arab-held triangle north of Nablus. In the battle for Jerusalem the emphasis has shifted from the city itself to its supply line. Arab Legion troops have followed up their capture of the Old City by closing in on the strongly entrenched Jewish forces in the New City, but the main effort of both sides is now being made around Latrun and in the Lydda-Ramle area, along the supply road, with the Arabs still effective in preventing a Jewish breakthrough. At the same time, other Arab forces advancing on Tel Aviv are about 10 miles from the Israeli capital. Iraqi units have recaptured Ras el Ein, the Jerusalem water supply station northeast of Tel Aviv, while other Iraqi troops are reported to have driven through to the coast north of Tel Aviv. Egyptian columns advancing from the south are reported at Yibna, a few

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miles south of the Lydda-Ramle battlefield. Jewish efforts have consisted mainly of counter-attacks in the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem sector. However, Hagana forces attacking from the north have already reached the neighborhood of Jenin, northwesternmost town of the triangular stronghold of the Arabs in north-central Palestine. If continued, this offensive against the principal Arab supply base might force the diversion of Arab troops from central Palestine and thus relieve the pressure on Tel Aviv.

GREECE

Guerrillas seeking peace? Possible Satellite-guerrilla peace feelers, albeit scattered and tentative, may be observed in certain recent developments. The Bulgars have told a neutral representative that their government might take steps to resume normal relations with the "monarcho-fascist" government in Athens. The Yugoslav delegate at the UN has been discussing the Greek situation in a tone which is unexpectedly described as conciliatory. An Albanian note to the Secretary General of the UN, although couched in the usual vituperative terms, suggests that it is possible for Greece to settle amicably its differences with Albania. Finally, on 1 June the "democratic" army radio broadcast a declaration that the "democratic" government is "always ready to accept and encourage any initiative coming from anywhere" which would "lead to peace."

These developments and the continuing failure of the Satellites to furnish significant aid to the guerrillas suggest that the Kremlin may have decided to abandon the military phase of the Communist program in Greece. If such is the case, guerrilla leaders may well be seeking a formula for ending hostilities without prejudicing the ultimate Communist objective in Greece. The Greek Government, aware of such a danger, is not likely to come to terms with the guerrillas. If, however, Communist leaders are able to obtain political concessions from the Greek Government before the army has achieved an absolute victory, public morale will be impaired and the hard core of the Greek Communist Party will be left intact. Such a situation would eventually expose an unstable Greece to the familiar, dreary round of Communist political obstruction, blackmail, and economic strangulation, resulting finally in a total Communist victory.

Action on the right: A Greek general's defiance of the courts has furnished new evidence that ultra-rightists in Greece are impatient with legal processes in dealing with Communism and that some of them are willing to take matters into their own hands. The latest of

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several recent right-wing excesses, the incident concerns the commanding general of the 1st Division, who ordered the arrest and exile of two wealthy merchants for selling flour to the guerrillas, although they had just been acquitted of the charge by unanimous vote of the Athens Pardon Board. The merchants appear to have been framed by the reactionary X-ite group, and their acquittal was bitterly denounced by right-wing newspapers.

Despite the fear of some moderate officials that such actions may culminate in a breakdown of civil authority, followed by a coup d'etat, a revival of the pre-war machinations of military cliques is not likely, in view of the absence of an outstanding extremist leader. However, the Government is keeping careful watch for the emergence of any military group which could threaten its overthrow.

TURKEY

Friction with Bulgaria continues: Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, already bad, are growing worse. Some weeks ago the Turkish Military Attache in Sofia was compelled to return home, and shortly afterwards the Turks, in retaliation, evicted his opposite number from Ankara. Then last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak publicly charged that the Bulgarians were making it impossible for Turkey's consular representatives in Bulgaria to perform their duties. He declared that they were being subjected to the "same difficulties and unjustified treatment" which had been inflicted on the military attache. Although an open break in relations between the two countries has thus far been avoided, there is a limit to the amount of pressure which Turkish pride will suffer. It is certain that the Turks, in the midst of a prolonged international crisis, will patiently try to preserve formally correct relations with Bulgaria. Should the Turkish Government estimate, however, that public opinion will not permit it to endure further insult, Ankara may decide to sever relations. If such a decision is made, the government may merely recall all its diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria, or it may announce unilaterally that diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries are officially ended.

LEBANON

President al Khuri's reelection: President Bisharah al Khuri's personal prestige has been strikingly demonstrated by the unanimous action of the Chamber of Deputies in granting him a second six-year term in office a full year before his present one expires. The vote, taken 27 May, culminated months of maneuvering by Khuri's

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supporters, who first had to push through a constitutional amendment permitting the president to serve two consecutive terms.

Having assured his own continuance in office, Khuri will probably order dissolution of the Chamber and new parliamentary elections in order to quiet criticism of the high pressure methods used to get him reelected. The balloting for the present Chamber last year was attended by loud shouts of fraud, and new elections would be both popular and attention-gaining.

IRAN

The prime ministerial sweepstakes: While Prime Minister Hakim continues to astonish Tehran political circles by his ability to remain in office without visible means of support, parliamentary or otherwise, his would-be successors are frantically jockeying for position. The USSR (which has just engaged in a sharp exchange of notes with Iran over a border incident) is reportedly backing two such candidates, and it is barely possible that a prime minister more responsive to Soviet handling might take office in the confusion attending Hakim's fall. However, former Prime Minister Qavam remains the most likely candidate for the job, and unless he is unable to arrive at any sort of modus vivendi with the Shah, a rival is not likely to obtain the premiership.

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